

DIA review(s) completed.

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15 JAN 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. U. Alexis Johnson - State
Dr. Brockway MacMillan - Air Force (NRO)
Dr. Albert Wheelon - CIA
Mr. Adrian Fisher - ACDA
Mr. Robert Seamans, Jr. - NASA
Mr. Edward Welsh - NASC
Mr. Charles Johnson - White House
Mr. Edward R. Murrow - USIA

SUBJECT: Consideration of Possible Disclosure of Satellite Reconnaissance Information

At the meeting of an interagency group on January 8, 1964 I agreed to obtain information on the extent of disclosure of reconnaissance satellite materials and intelligence data derived from this source through military channels; and some assessment of the confidence which NATO military personnel have in our intelligence data since the satellite source has been available. I believe the following information will be adequate to aid the group in its further deliberations.

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The principal categories of targets included in these publications and charts which reflect an improving quality in our intelligence gathering capabilities are ICBM, IRBM, MRBM and SAM sites, airfields and aircraft on airfields. Information on other categories of targets is being improved by satellite reconnaissance and reflected in the above intelligence data being made available to our NATO allies. The European Soviet Bloc Target Data Inventory and related maps and charts which we make available to NATO allies through military channels covers the area west of 35° E longitude.

25X1 DIA The materials made available [redacted] are not very revealing of details of critical targets from which inferences might be drawn as to the quality of our source. The TDI merely gives the target category and its geographical coordinates. Air target charts also show only the location of the target and include no local details. The charts include local detail such as number and general size of buildings, bridges, railroad yards, power plants and other industrial facilities but not details of missile sites. That is, installations that might plausibly be observed from the ground or from older intelligence data are described in some detail in contrast to missile sites. On some air target charts, stylized emblems showing, for example, typical launch pad building complex layouts are used. These reveal that we know types of base layouts. Also since many of the missile sites are in woods well away from railroads and roads, our information implies overhead observation. However, very little detail on these remote targets has been put into NATO channels. The Army map series, although showing detail more appropriate to ground combat similarly contain little detail on remote, critical installations.

It is estimated that in excess of 300 allied officers in SHAPE Headquarters and major allied subordinate commands have had access to this satellite photography derived data. These officers are in command echelons, plans and policy, operation and intelligence elements of the various international staffs. Forty copies of the NATO TDI are distributed to the Allied Commands.

In terms of action pending to make more satellite acquired intelligence available to our NATO allies the following might be reported to those members of the group not already aware of it. In support of the decision to encourage greater multinational participation in nuclear planning the JCS have recommended modification of Sino-Soviet Bloc TDI to provide NATO with additional information. This would involve the inclusion in the

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NATO European Soviet Bloc TDI of categories of targets previously excluded. Those items which contain satellite-derived information will be approximately 10 percent or about 1,000 out of 11,000 items to be added to the NATO TDI. This matter is under consideration by the USIB. Further action is being held in abeyance pending completion of a review by the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance of sanitization and downgrading procedures applicable to TALENT-KEYHOLE materials. The results of this effort would seem to have a bearing on any recommendations which the interagency group might make.

The question of the confidence factor ascribed to U.S. intelligence data derived from satellite reconnaissance is difficult to assess

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There has been recognition of improving capabilities in our intelligence data, particularly in the NREH, SAM and airfield order of battle areas, which could not be realized without overhead reconnaissance. This data are generally accepted without serious question, but occasionally questions of source arise. One can probably assume that NATO allied military confidence in our intelligence and target information based on satellite photography is reasonably high.

SIGNED

Deputy

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